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Abstract
Using overvalued stock as a method of payment for acquisitions commonly raises the question of
whether managers are influenced by Jensen’s overvalued stock hypothesis. Jensen’s overvalued
stock hypothesis posits that managers are pressured to engage in value-destructive investments to
justify the high valuation of equity. Additionally, the cheap and accessible equity capital, as well as
the overconfidence and enthusiasm of recent IPO firms are expected to further exacerbate this
behavior. As a result, post-IPO stock acquisitions are expected to underperform post-IPO cash
acquisitions.
Taking a sample of 760 stock-financed acquisition post-five-years IPO from 1 January 1985 to 31
December 2009, this paper references the (i) linear prediction model and (ii) various propensity
score matching methodology by Golubov, Petmezas, and Travlos (2015) to obtain the pure takeover
effect, independent of equity issuance effect. The paper presents a univariate analysis on the pure
takeover effect for cash and stock-acquirers respectively. With a multivariate regression, the paper
also compares the effect of stock as a method of payment, against other firm and deal-related
characteristics.
This paper does not find evidence of Jensen’s overvalued equity hypothesis, indicating that there
are no signs of post-IPO managers being influenced by Jensen’s overvalued equity pressure, i.e.
managers are not wrongly incentivized to pursue negative net present value investments. This is
consistent with the general research conducted on both recent IPO and mature acquirers by
Golubov, Petmezas, and Travlos (2015). The analysis on post-one-year and three-years IPO also do
not present evidence for Jensen’s hypothesis. This puzzle might be resolved by future research on
stringent public market regulations and the influence of institutional ownership, both for recent IPO
and mature public firms.
Keywords post-IPO, agency cost, overvalued stock hypothesis, stock-financed M&A
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1. Introduction
Why do recent IPO (initial public offering) firms engage in stock-financed acquisitions when cash
is abundant? Are IPO managers driven to seek out positive NPV (net present value) investment
opportunities, or perhaps, motivated by seemingly opportunistic investments primarily driven by
overvalued equity agency cost? In any case, there lies a danger for overconfident IPO managers,
potentially blinded by the creation of, commonly overvalued public stock currency, together with
the abundance of cash, to engage in value-destructive M&A. Even without the element of IPO, the
use of stock as a method of payment for general firms is widely known to yield a subpar return in
comparison to cash-financed acquisitions (Travlos, 1987). Loughran and Vijh (1997) also showed
evidence for an excess return of -25.0 percent in stock acquisitions, whereas cash acquisitions
would earn an excess return of +61.7 percent between the years of 1970 to 1989. The conventional
theory explains that a manager’s financing decision is presumed by the market participants to have
an adverse selection, in other words, signaling “bad news” whenever stock issuance is used to
engage in any investment activity, hence any stock-related issuance, including stock-financed
acquisition and SEO (secondary equity offering) will follow a downward announcement effect
(Myers and Majluf, 1984; Baker and Wurgler, 2002). For recent-IPO firms, it is possible to
circumvent this by using the abundant cash in acquiring other companies, yet oddly there is still a
handful of acquirers who prefer stock as a method of payment. Even in the worst-case scenario
where IPO proceeds are insufficient to cover deal value, the ease (access to public equity market)
of conducting a post-IPO SEO and debt financing followed by a cash-acquisition is more favorable
than outrightly conducting a stock-financed acquisition.
A prelude to the hypothesis in this paper is presented by Celikyurt, Sevilir, and Shivdasani’s (2010)
study, in that, recent-IPO firms with overvalued stock are found to engage in a greater number of
stock-financed acquisitions. This phenomenon invites the presence of Jensen’s (2005) “agency
costs of overvalued equity” hypothesis, which argues that such an environment facilitates an
unhealthy pressure on managers to meet or exceed earning expectations to justify “overvalued”
equity prices. This pressure incentivizes managers to engage in risky and negative net present
value investments, especially with easy access to cheap equity. Brau, Couch, and Sutton (2012)
further provide evidence of the value-destructive post-IPO M&A, citing the “enthusiasm” of IPO
exacerbates classic value-destructive theories like acquirer’s overconfidence and overpaying
tendencies (Roll, 1986), prestige overconfidence (Rau and Vermaelen, 1998; Malmendier and Tate,
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2008), overconfidence within the technology industry acquirers (Kohers and Kohers, 2001) and
agency cost by cash-rich firms (Jensen, 1986). Similarly, this paper expects to find recent-IPO
stock-acquirers underperforming cash-acquirers, as well as mature firms.
Another unique feature of this paper is that it recognizes the joint takeover announcement effect
in an ACARstock (stock-acquisition announcement) as a combination of (i) an equity issuance
announcement effect (HCAR) and (ii) a takeover announcement effect (PCARstock). It is possible
that the information effect from the (i) equity issuance announcement effect more than offset any
positive (ii) takeover announcement effects. In that case, the paper would wrongly conclude the
presence of agency cost amongst overconfident recent IPO firms. Following the empirical method
by Golubov, Petmezas, and Travlos (2015), this paper disentangles the financing announcement
returns (HCAR) from acquisition announcement returns (ACARstock) before comparing the returns
and performing a regression between stock payment and acquirer’s return.
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝐶𝐴𝑅 ≡ 𝑇𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝐴𝑅 + 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐶𝐴𝑅
𝐴𝐶𝐴𝑅 ≡ 𝑃𝐶𝐴𝑅 + 𝐻𝐶𝐴𝑅
Taking a sample of 1,853 post-IPO M&A – 1,093 cash-financed and 760 stock-financed from 1
January 1985 to 31 December 2009, this paper uses (1) a linear prediction and (2) various
propensity matching technique to obtain HCAR (hypothetical cumulative abnormal returns). The
linear prediction approach uses the coefficients from a regression of SEO returns on various firm
characteristics to estimate equity HCAR for stock-financed acquirers, whereas the propensity
matching approach restricts the SEO sample group using different matching methods (full-optimal
matching, 1-nearest, and 10-nearest neighbor) to find HCAR. The next step is to subtract the
HCAR from the ACARstock to obtain the PCARstock. To clarify, PCARcash is expected to be the
same as ACARcash, given the lack of HCAR, equity issuance effect. If indeed Jensen’s hypothesis
is true, the pure takeover announcement effect, PCARstock will be lower than PCARcash.
The results from this paper cannot conclude that recent-IPO managers make ill investment
decisions under the influence of Jensen’s overvalued equity hypothesis, since PCARstock is
statistically insignificant for all models (Table V). In the multivariate regression, the negative




with stock payment. This is due to the statistically insignificant results, as well as the relatively
small magnitude, and mixed coefficient signs. Similar results are found in the analysis conducted
for one-year and three-year post-IPO M&As (see Appendix 7.3).
This paper primarily contributes to the M&A literature by examining whether the deliberate
decision for a stock-financed post-IPO acquisition is due to Jensen’s overvalued equity hypothesis.
In addition, this paper hopes to vindicate the similar but broader scoped M&A research by Golubov
et al. (2015), however to no avail; again, finding no presence of Jensen’s hypothesis. This paper
also contributes to the IPO literature by examining whether the IPO motives are justified. Since
the decision of going public via an IPO is strongly contingent on the desire to conduct an M&A
(Celikyurt et al., 2010; Brau and Fawcett, 2006), it is important to evaluate whether this motivation
is valid. When a post-IPO M&A creates value despite the use of overvalued stock as acquisition
currency, then the decision for an IPO remains a rational one.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explores existing literature on post-IPO M&A, related
methods of payment choices, and empirical design. Section 3 describes the IPO, M&A, and SEO
sample. Section 4 showcase the main findings of the tests. Section 5 concludes by explaining the
conclusion, limitations, and future research directions.
2. Literature review and empirical design
2.1 Post-IPO M&A
Initial Public Offering (IPO) is the offering of public shares on a securities exchange for the first
time. In the context of IPO, the question of inefficient investment decisions arose, when many
observed the long-run underperformance of IPO firms. Ritter (1991) in analyzing 1,526 US IPO
firms from 1975 to 1984 reports an underperformance of -15.81% three years post-IPO against
other mature firms. Similarly, Loughran and Ritter (1995) reports a 7% difference between
NASDAQ, NYSE, AMEX mature firms, and 4,753 recent-US IPO firms five years post-IPO.
In a recent paper by Brau, Couch, and Sutton (2012), they suggest that IPO underperformance is
caused by post-IPO M&A activity, especially when these firms undertake the role as an acquirer.
The authors noticed the prevalence of post-IPO M&A activity (Rau and Stouraitis, 2011; Celikyurt
et. al., 2010; Brau and Fawcett, 2006), as well as, the coincidental period of IPO underperformance,
then empirically conclude that active M&A activity as an acquirer explains the −15.6% (−23.1%)
three-year (five-year) average abnormal buy-and-hold return compared to 5.9% (1.1%) for non-
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acquirers. Regardless of IPO maturity, this is in line with traditional M&A theories which supports
the notion of underperformance amongst M&A acquirers (Loughran and Vijh, 1997; Rau and
Vermaelen, 1998).
Related to M&A underperformance also exists other inefficiencies, largely related to methods of
payment. Generally, the presence of asymmetric information regarding buyer or seller (Hansen,
1987), greater investment opportunities (Jung, Kim, and Stulz, 1995), and lower institutional
holdings (Jensen, 1991) prompts a higher probability of conducting a stock-financed acquisition
for all firms alike, despite ample research on the underperformance of using stock as a method of
payment (Travlos, 1987; Wansley, Lane, and Yang, 1987; Franks,  Harris, and Mayer, 1988;
Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins, 1987; Servaes, 1991; Amihud, Lev, and Travlos, 1990; Agrawal,
Jaffe, and Mandelker, 1992; Linn and Switzer, 2001). Although there is little direct research
pointing to the method of payments affecting post-IPO M&A performance, Brau, Couch and
Sutton (2012) allude to several stock-related inefficiencies that arise within post-IPO M&A,
largely related to overconfidence. Naturally, this paper also aims to bridge the lack of research in
this field.
Since many pieces of literature found a positive and significant relationship between method of
payment and underperformance as an acquirer, one would expect only a handful of stock-financed
acquisition amongst acquirers, especially post-IPO firms whose cash reserves are high and access
to debt and SEO market is easy. Contrary to expectations, it is found more often than not, (i) an
IPO wave is closely followed by a stock-financed acquisition wave (Rau and Stouraitis, 2011), (ii)
the increase in the use of stock as payment increased drastically from 3% three-years prior IPO to
21% three-years after IPO (Signori and Vismara, 2016) and (iii) recent-IPO firm engage in a higher
volume of stock-financed acquisition than that of mature firms (Celikyurt, et.al., 2010). Against
these findings, financial slack - cash and marketable securities scaled by total assets, is also oddly
found to increase the likelihood of using stock as a method of payment. (Hovakimian and Hutton,
2009). It is crucial to note that these observations do not imply that cash-financed acquisitions are
few compared to stock-financed acquisitions. In fact, cash is quite often the preferred method of
payment for post-IPO acquisitions (Celikyurt, 2010; Arikan and Stultz, 2016). However, since
there still exist these handful of post-IPO stock-financed acquisitions, it is important to question
the justifications for these post-IPO stock-acquisitions.
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A contrarian might argue that that recent IPO firms can be rightly motivated by the desires to
pursue targets that are value-accretive, however, only to be hindered by expensive cost ie. “larger
and have higher market-to-book ratio” (Hovakimian and Hutton, 2009) where the primary IPO
proceeds are insufficient to pay for these expensive value-accretive targets. This position, however,
is inconsistent with the acquirer’s well position in the debt and SEO market (Celikyurt, et. al.,
2010). It is seen as more reasonable to either accumulate more cash via an SEO or debt financing
and then subsequently conduct a cash-financed acquisition. All rational reasoning dissuades post-
IPO acquirers from engaging in a stock-financed acquisition. Since many prominent authors found
the creation of overvalued stock currency to be the main motivation for stock acquisitions, the
literature review continues in this direction (Celikyurt et. al., 2010; Hovakimian and Hutton, 2009;
Jensen, 2005).
2.2 Overvalued equity hypothesis
The motivation for post-IPO stock-financed acquisitions is found to be driven by the presence of
overvalued equity, especially with the creation of often overvalued stock currency (Celikyurt, et.
al., 2010). While there are several positive motivations for using overvalued equity in acquisitions,
such as “lower effective cost of paying for an equally overvalued target”, to obtain “information
of true firm value or synergy” and have a greater selection pool of value-accretive targets
(Celikyurt, et. al., 2010), it is equally well-recognized that overvalued stock equity often
accompanies various agency cost problems, famously pioneered by Jensen (2005). While Golubov,
et al. (2015) find no evidence of Jensen’s hypothesis in their general stock-financed M&A sample,
Hovakimian and Hutton (2009) and Brau, Sutton, and Couch (2012) propose that the
overconfidence of IPO managers could make recent IPO firms more susceptible than mature firms.
Jensen (2005) explains that, with overvalued equity, managers are influenced by pressure to sustain
an impossible high stock price, hence excessively undertaking risky and negative value-destroying
investments with its now cheap equity issues. Brau, Couch, and Sutton (2012) explain that the
overenthusiasm and overconfidence of recent-IPO firms compared to mature firms induces classic
value-destructive theories like acquirer’s overconfidence and overpaying tendencies (Roll, 1986),
prestige overconfidence (Rau and Vermaelen, 1998; Malmendier and Tate, 2008), overconfidence
within the technology industry acquirers (Kohers and Kohers, 2001) and agency cost by cash-rich
firms (Jensen, 1986).
9
Under the overconfidence argument, decision-makers (often founder CEOs) of recent-IPO firms
are often characterized as overconfident, which leads to a higher likelihood of engaging in value-
destroying acquisitions. Many types of research supported this stance, showing that entrepreneurs
have higher levels of optimism compared to non-entrepreneurial individuals (Camerer and Lovallo,
1999; Cooper, Woo, and Dunkelberg, 1988; Lowe and Ziedonis, 2006). Forbes (2005) also finds
a higher confidence level in founder-managers than in non-founder managers. Lee, Kim, and Reuer
(2016) further justify this viewpoint that founder CEO-managed firms experience worse abnormal
returns than professional CEO-managed firms in M&A transactions due to overconfidence by
ruling out other alternative reasons such as private benefits of control and inferior M&A skills.
Consistent with other prominent research, when overconfidence is a factor of post-IPO M&A
consideration, these overconfident managers often overestimate synergy potential and have a
higher tendency to overpay and engage in bidding competitions, which leads to value-destroying
acquisitions (Roll, 1987; Malmendier and Tate, 2008). Overall, the above reasons predict that
managers of recent-IPO firms are more prone to exploit the overvalued equity window due to the
post-IPO overconfidence.
Another motivation for value-destructive decision-making is the increased availability of cash and
access to greater financing options. Compared to mature firms, recent IPO firms have greater cash
for potential acquisitions, a better position for SEO proceeds, and a better debt financing structure
(Arikan and Stulz, 2016). Harford (1999) provides evidence that a higher cash holding is found to
prompt managers to engage in acquisitions, in which, majority of these bids each bid destroys 7%
of excess cash reserves in market value. Jensen (1986) also shows how the presence of large free
cash flows creates agency cost conflict between shareholders and managers and especially for
equity takeover activities, in which there are strong grounds to believe that recent-IPO firms will
exhibit a clearer presence of Jensen’s overvalued equity hypothesis than general or mature firms.
Interestingly, the converse is plausible as well. Recent-IPO firms experience less time pressure to
decide on hasty investments, which could be less value-destructive; unlike mature firms whose
“cash flow outstrips their internal growth opportunities and management becomes more
entrenched” (Arikan and Stultz, 2016). The mature firm then eventually engages in desperate
acquisitions at the expense of shareholder wealth (Mueller, 1972; Jensen, 1986).
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In summary, this paper expects to find evidence of Jensen’s overvalued equity hypothesis, which
is yet found in the more general stock-financed acquisition research by Golubov et al. (2015).
2.3 Empirical method
Apart from being the first paper to examine the effects of method of payments on post-IPO M&A,
this paper also strives to be critical upon the takeover effect, given the many cautions against
confounding effects of equity financing and takeover announcement returns. The clear statement
put forth by Rau and Stouraitis (2011): “A stock-financed acquisition is a combination of a
financing activity (an SEO) and an investment activity (an acquisition). A cash-financed
acquisition is more likely to be a pure investment.” clearly summarizes the need to assess takeover
effect, independent of equity financing effects. Other authors such as Hansen (1987: 77), Eckbo,
Giammarino, and Heinkel (1990: 668), Bhagat et al. (2005) and Golubov, et al. (2015) also share
the same beliefs, emphasizing the potential spillover effect from equity-financing announcement
effects into stock-acquisitions announcement effects.
Similar attributes between SEO and stock-financed acquisitions are seen in the stock price run-ups
prior to an event announcement, as well as, the similar explanatory variables influencing event
announcement returns. One example is the positive stock-price run-up before SEO and stock-
acquisition events (Asquith and Mullins, 1986; Rosen, 2006).
For the IPO sample, this poses an even greater danger with the possibility of a third confounding
effect from a recent IPO announcement (Jegadeesh, Weinstein, and Welch, 1993), depending on
the duration between IPO and M&A. To minimize this effect, the analysis below will take a five-
year post-IPO duration. Additional analysis performed on the one-year and three-year sample (see
Appendix 7.3) must be read with this in mind. The following empirical method aims to make a
distinction between the information conveyed via an equity-financing event and a stock-
acquisition event, following the same method by Golubov et al. (2015).
2.3.1 Linear prediction
The first approach is to regress the SEO issuer announcement returns (ICARSEO) with its respective
firm variables (X’) – LNMARCAP, BEME, RUNUP, SIGMA, RELSIZE, LEVERAGE,
CASHHOLD, CF/EQ and OPERPERF with industry and year fixed effects. The description of
these variables can be found in the Appendix 7.1 and the coefficients in Table IV- Panel A
Specification (1).
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The implied HCAR for post-IPO acquirers, assumed to independently announced an SEO rather
than an equity-financed acquisition, are then estimated by fitting the same X’ variables of stock-
acquirers with the respective 𝛽  coefficients. From the actual announcement effect of stock-
financed acquirers (ACARstock), HCAR is used to separate the equity-financing effect, leaving
behind the pure takeover value (PCARstock) essential for decision-making.
Lastly, PCARall is regressed against various firm and deal characteristic variables to examine
whether stock as a method of payment has a significant effect on PCARall, with the presence of
other variables that could potentially affect PCARall as well.
2.3.2 Propensity score matching
The second approach uses the propensity-score matching technique, taking first a probit regression
between the binary choices of stock-financed M&A or SEO with firm characteristics X’ and then
match both sample groups using the full-optimal, 1-nearest, and 10-nearest-neighbors’ methods.
Instead of creating a set of hypothetical unreal HCAR in linear prediction, this method selectively
restricts or matches the control SEO samples to its treatment stock-financed acquirers based on
propensity scores, and subsequently pool a set of real ICARSEO from the matched control SEO
sample.
The objective of this matching technique is to find the closest SEO peer in approximating HCAR
while reducing the confounding effects since the treatment (stock-financed acquirers) and control
(SEO issuers) group share the same covariates (X’ firm characteristics) (Ho et al., 2007). This is
achieved by assessing the balance, or standardized mean differences that are near zero (see
Appendix 7.2).
The most common method is 1-nearest matching (Thoemmes and Kim, 2011; Zakrison, Austin,
and McCredie, 2018), where the software package (MATCHIT in R) seeks to pair the propensity




with this method is decent in comparison to unmatched SEO (see Appendix 7.2). 10-nearest
matching instead finds 10 nearest control samples to match with each treatment group.
Full optimal matching “assigns every treated and control unit in the sample to one subclass each”
(Hansen 2004; Stuart and Green 2008). This method best optimizes the mean of the absolute
within-subclass distances in the matched sample (see Appendix 7.2), where most covariates are
near zero compared to before matching. Each subclass is free to have a different number of paired
controls i.e. one treated unit and one or more control units or one control unit and one or more
treated units, regardless, in order to achieve the best covariate balance. Full matching does not
discard any control samples, however, at times might be at the cost of precision when the weighted
matched controls would at times contribute less than in unmatched sample and 1-nearest matched
sample. But since 1-nearest and 10-nearest matching are not effective (see Appendix 7.2), full
matching provides the best alternative matching.
Again, the paper regress PCARall found from the propensity score estimated effects, against other
deal characteristics to find explanatory power for pure takeover effects.
3. Sample selection and description
This paper has three sets of samples. First, the paper collects a set of IPO samples from 1 January
1985 to 31 December 2009. From the IPO sample, a set of M&A samples is collected with an
emphasis to examine the raw cumulative announcement returns (ACAR), 5-years after the IPO
event as an acquirer. To remove the announcement effect (refer to Equation 1), a set of SEO
samples is collected to approximate and estimate the equity financing effect (HCAR). This equity
financing effect is used to purify the raw cumulative announcement returns found in the M&A
samples before further analysis.
3.1 IPO sample
5,234 IPO sample was extracted from EIKON Equity Screener, from 1 January 1985 to 31
December 2009, with a focus on issuer within the United States of America, excluding transactions
that are canceled or unknown. The sample is also filtered by the CRSP share code of 10 and 11 to
ensure that they do not contain closed-end funds, unit investment trusts, real estate investment
trusts, and American Depositary Receipts. These IPO firms trade on the NYSE, AMEX, and
NASDAQ exchanges. Out of these 5.234 IPO, only 1,383 IPO engages in a post-IPO M&A as an
acquirer. The low 26.4% participation rate as an acquirer post-IPO does not contradict Celikyurt’s
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(2010) findings, because unlike Celikyurt, this paper does not restrict the IPO sample with gross
proceeds above USD 57 million (in 1985 dollars).
Table I reports descriptive statistics for the 1,383 IPO sample. The number of IPO is rather stable
across the years but with increased volume in the year 1991-2000. The gross proceeds range from
USD 2 – 759 million, but on average, USD 63.6 million across the 25 years. The highest IPO
proceeds is seen in 2009 and this is consistent with the occurrence of the 2008 financial bubble.
IPO underpricing is shown to be a proxy for IPO overvaluation (Purnanandam and Swaminathan,
2004). IPO overvaluation is a factor of consideration while deciding between stock versus cash
acquisition methods (Celikyurt, 2010), however, a large 83% of the sample data do not report price
1 day after offer. Amongst these IPO firms, 23.6% engaged in an M&A in the immediate one-year
post-IPO. By year 4, every IPO firm would have already conducted an M&A as an acquirer (Table
I).
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Table I. IPO sample descriptive statistics
The table shows the sample descriptive statistic for 1,343 completed post-IPO public acquisitions in the United States of
America from 1 January 1985 and 31 December 2009. Data are collected from the Thomson Financial SDC M&A Database. All
variables are defined in Appendix 7.1.
3.2 M&A sample
In the subsequent 5 years post-IPO, a total of 1,853 M&As were filtered from a list of 10,349
M&A activity related to the IPO firms. Most of the M&A activity excluded was due to the period
of M&A either before the IPO or after the five years window post-IPO. Other exclusion was due
to a lack of firm or deal characteristic information, as well as, M&A engagement as a target. Most
of the IPO firms conducted at least one M&A within the first four years post-IPO (Table I).
These M&A activities are tracked from EIKON Deal Analytics and Thomson Eikon SDC. The
sample includes completed M&A activity both as an acquirer, with either stock or cash method of
payment exclusively (100%). All acquirers are located in the United States of America. The criteria
however exclude any acquisitions related to bankruptcy acquisition, going private, leveraged
buyout, liquidation, privatization, repurchase, reverse takeover, and restructuring. The percentage
share held before an acquisition is less than 10% and post-acquisition is more than 50%. When
Average gross Number of M&As with n-years post-IPO
Year N % proceed (USD mil) 0-1 0-2 0-3 0-4 0-5
Panel A: Distribution by Year
1985 20 1.5% $13.0 0 1 3 3 6
1986 50 3.7% $21.2 1 6 12 20 26
1987 46 3.4% $23.4 10 14 19 26 30
1988 18 1.3% $36.9 1 4 5 7 9
1989 23 1.7% $30.9 0 2 12 15 21
1990 28 2.1% $29.7 1 4 13 23 31
1991 68 5.1% $34.5 7 28 42 70 88
1992 82 6.1% $35.0 11 40 58 100 117
1993 113 8.4% $31.2 28 70 112 146 177
1994 82 6.1% $27.8 10 45 71 103 123
1995 96 7.1% $38.5 31 71 106 135 147
1996 159 11.8% $43.1 47 140 220 268 292
1997 95 7.1% $35.9 36 86 99 107 116
1998 62 4.6% $45.7 27 70 106 126 145
1999 108 8.0% $67.8 43 98 113 128 157
2000 68 5.1% $83.7 18 49 63 74 91
2001 20 1.5% $55.3 2 4 12 20 25
2002 20 1.5% $101.2 4 9 16 22 28
2003 17 1.3% $147.1 5 12 18 23 24
2004 38 2.8% $142.8 4 12 28 38 41
2005 37 2.8% $219.7 9 26 40 49 51
2006 40 3.0% $137.7 7 20 33 40 49
2007 41 3.1% $189.6 11 16 28 37 44
2008 3 0.2% $182.3 0 0 1 2 3
2009 9 0.7% $368.3 4 8 12 12 12
Total 1343 100.0% $63.6 317 835 1242 1594 1853
15
cross-referenced with the Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database, the acquirers
are under share code 10 and 11 to exclude closed-end funds, unit investment trusts, real estate
investment trusts, and American Depositary Receipts. Most of these criteria are consistent with
other M&A literature such as Golubov, Petmezas, and Travlos (2015), Savor and Lu (2009), and
Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007). The selection process yielded 1,853 deals with 1,093 cash-only
acquisitions and 760 stock-only acquisitions.
Table II - Panel A showcased the variables and in particular the ACAR (see Appendix 7.1 for
description) of the acquirer in the -2 to +2 announcement period between the acquisition
announcement day. The expected market returns are based on a CAPM market model estimated
over 200 trading days ending 41 days before the announcement. The mean (median) of ACARall
is 0.67% (0.60%). The mean with a p-value of 0.538 is not statistically significant. Between the
different methods of payment, the average ACARstock is -0.57% and ACARcash are 1.54%
(statistically significant at a <1% level). The difference in mean between ACARstock and ACARcash
is a high 2.11%, highly statistically significant at a 5% significant level. Overall, this is consistent
with Travlos’ (1987) research that cash-financed acquisitions yield a higher return than a stock-
financed acquisition, as well as, the sample descriptions by the reference paper Golubov et.al.
(2015).
In general, stock-financed acquisitions are larger (MARCAP), higher in firm idiosyncratic
volatility (SIGMA), has a higher amount of debts (LEVERAGE), higher cash holdings
(CASHHOLD), higher deal size (DEAL VALUE) compared to cash-financed acquisitions. Again,
the curious case of high cash holdings (and debt), implies the possibility of a cash-financed
acquisition, yet 41% of the M&A sample decides to use stock in an acquisition. On top of that, a
low book-to-market ratio (BEME) also indicates a relative overvaluation for stock-acquirers as
anticipated by Jensen’s hypothesis. Cash-financed acquisitions, on the other hand, have a higher
book-value to market-value ratio (BEME), buy-and-hold return (RUNUP), better operating
performance (OPERPERF) and cash flow-to-equity ratio (CF/EQ).
The number of tender offers (TENDER) and number of competing bidders (MULTIBID) of cash-
financed acquisitions also exceed that of stock-financed acquisitions. From Panel D, it is evident
that the period of 1994-2001 was the most active period for M&A activities. This trend is similar
for both cash and stock-financed acquisitions.
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Table II. M&A sample descriptive statistics
The table shows the sample descriptive statistics for 1,853 completed post-IPO public acquisitions in the United States of
America from 1 January 1985 and 31 December 2014. Data are collected from the Thomson Financial SDC M&A Database. All
variables are defined in Appendix 7.1. Panels A–C are for all deals, stock deals, and cash deals, respectively. Panel D shows the
yearly composition, and Panel E the industry composition of the sample. NM&A denotes the number of observations respectively
for all deals, stock deals, and cash deals.
NM&A Mean SD Min P25 Median P75 Max
Panel A: All
MARCAP (in $ mil.) 1853 6,208.69 31,119.18 12.87 172.26 489.53 1289.22 490,266.75
BEME 1853 0.334 0.365 -2.118 0.137 0.254 0.445 7.591
RUN-UP 1853 0.007 0.116 -0.788 -0.046 0.002 0.058 1.090
SIGMA 1853 0.037 0.018 0.005 0.025 0.032 0.045 0.166
LEVERAGE 1853 0.170 0.146 0.008 0.081 0.133 0.211 1.928
CASHHOLD 1853 0.296 0.260 0.000 0.047 0.244 0.496 0.999
OPERPERF 1853 0.007 0.176 -1.600 -0.008 0.047 0.090 0.725
CF/EQ 1853 0.150 0.441 -1.554 -0.008 0.000 0.128 6.177
DEAL VALUE 1853 184.557 849.248 0.010 9.875 30.000 97.562 21422.965
RELSIZE 1853 0.177 0.406 0.000 0.021 0.058 0.166 5.149
HOSTILE 1853 0.001 0.023 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
TENDER 1853 0.056 0.230 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
MULTIBID 1853 0.005 0.073 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
ACAR 1853 0.67% 11.72% -105.05% -4.47% 0.60% 6.16% 83.30%
Panel B: Stock
MARCAP (in $ mil.) 760 9,428.66 41,989.43 13.46 240.16 664.56 1847.43 490,266.75
BEME 760 0.247 0.347 -0.496 0.091 0.191 0.319 7.591
RUN-UP 760 -0.006 0.132 -0.788 -0.069 -0.011 0.056 1.090
SIGMA 760 0.044 0.020 0.009 0.029 0.039 0.055 0.166
LEVERAGE 760 0.215 0.175 0.011 0.107 0.164 0.273 1.659
CASHHOLD 760 0.388 0.270 0.000 0.148 0.373 0.615 0.985
OPERPERF 760 -0.038 0.224 -1.600 -0.094 0.036 0.087 0.337
CF/EQ 760 0.058 0.272 -1.554 -0.006 -0.001 0.022 4.430
DEAL VALUE 760 304.743 1267.438 0.010 14.999 46.000 160.698 21422.965
RELSIZE 760 0.166 0.240 0.000 0.023 0.067 0.203 1.882
HOSTILE 760 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
TENDER 760 0.012 0.108 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
MULTIBID 760 0.004 0.063 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
ACAR 760 -0.57% 13.32% -105.05% -6.70% -0.87% 6.16% 83.30%
Panel C: Cash
MARCAP (in $ mil.) 1093 3,960.90 20,060.89 12.87 145.99 411.53 971.23 245,003.58
BEME 1093 0.396 0.366 -2.118 0.184 0.332 0.524 3.407
RUN-UP 1093 0.016 0.102 -0.788 -0.032 0.010 0.060 0.548
SIGMA 1093 0.033 0.014 0.005 0.023 0.029 0.040 0.120
LEVERAGE 1093 0.138 0.111 0.008 0.072 0.115 0.172 1.928
CASHHOLD 1093 0.232 0.233 0.000 0.030 0.145 0.390 0.999
OPERPERF 1093 0.038 0.123 -1.547 0.010 0.052 0.093 0.725
CF/EQ 1093 0.214 0.519 -1.288 -0.009 0.011 0.235 6.177
DEAL VALUE 1093 100.657 295.067 0.011 7.500 22.000 66.000 0.011
RELSIZE 1093 0.184 0.490 0.000 0.020 0.054 0.136 5.149
HOSTILE 1093 0.001 0.030 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
TENDER 1093 0.087 0.282 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
MULTIBID 1093 0.006 0.080 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
ACAR 1093 1.54% 10.38% -105.05% -2.84% 1.24% 6.09% 54.32%
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The industry distribution of M&A is seen in Panel E. The most heavily distributed is business
services, including the information technology, research and development and service sectors,
which boomed during and post-2000. This might overweight the presence of agency cost given
that Kohers and Kohers (2001) show evidence of overconfidence amongst technology-related
acquisitions.
All Cash Stock
Year NM&A, all % NM&A, cash % NM&A, stock %
Panel D: Distribution by Year
1985 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
1986 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
1987 6 0.3% 4 0.4% 2 0.3%
1988 16 0.9% 9 0.8% 7 0.9%
1989 14 0.8% 9 0.8% 5 0.7%
1990 20 1.1% 13 1.2% 7 0.9%
1991 17 0.9% 13 1.2% 4 0.5%
1992 39 2.1% 20 1.8% 19 2.5%
1993 55 3.0% 35 3.2% 20 2.6%
1994 100 5.4% 68 6.2% 32 4.2%
1995 126 6.8% 60 5.5% 66 8.7%
1996 149 8.0% 68 6.2% 81 10.7%
1997 215 11.6% 105 9.6% 110 14.5%
1998 242 13.1% 134 12.3% 108 14.2%
1999 166 9.0% 62 5.7% 104 13.7%
2000 167 9.0% 62 5.7% 105 13.8%
2001 99 5.3% 50 4.6% 49 6.4%
2002 77 4.2% 67 6.1% 10 1.3%
2003 50 2.7% 38 3.5% 12 1.6%
2004 48 2.6% 40 3.7% 8 1.1%
2005 33 1.8% 31 2.8% 2 0.3%
2006 45 2.4% 44 4.0% 1 0.1%
2007 49 2.6% 44 4.0% 5 0.7%
2008 44 2.4% 44 4.0% 0 0.0%
2009 25 1.3% 22 2.0% 3 0.4%
2010 26 1.4% 26 2.4% 0 0.0%
2011 17 0.9% 17 1.6% 0 0.0%
2012 8 0.4% 8 0.7% 0 0.0%
2013 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
2014 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Total 1853 100.0% 1093 100.0% 760 100.0%
18
3.3 SEO sample
1,092 SEO samples are collected between the period of 1 January 1985 to 31 December 2009 and
their issuer nation is the United States of America. The transaction excludes status of unknown
and canceled issuance, as well as issues classified as a rights issue or a shelf offering, or
simultaneous offers of securities of other types (warrants or units). They are traded on the NYSE,
AMEX, and NASDAQ. The common stock issue is offered to the US public of the combination
All Cash Stock
NM&A, all % NM&A, cash % NM&A, stock %
Panel E: Distribution by Fama-French 48 industries
Agriculture 5 0.3% 4 0.1% 1 0.1%
Food Products 6 0.3% 6 0.1% 0 0.0%
Candy & Soda 1 0.1% 1 0.0% 0 0.0%
Beer & Liquor 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Tobacco Products 2 0.1% 2 0.0% 0 0.0%
Recreation 7 0.4% 7 0.3% 0 0.0%
Entertainment 22 1.2% 15 1.3% 7 0.9%
Printing and Publishing 20 1.1% 20 0.7% 0 0.0%
Consumer Goods 10 0.5% 10 0.3% 0 0.0%
Apparel 11 0.6% 11 0.8% 0 0.0%
Healthcare 82 4.4% 51 4.1% 31 4.1%
Medical Equipment 66 3.6% 49 3.7% 17 2.2%
Pharmaceutical Products 59 3.2% 23 2.8% 36 4.7%
Chemicals 10 0.5% 8 0.8% 2 0.3%
Rubber and Plastic Products 10 0.5% 6 0.8% 4 0.5%
Textiles 9 0.5% 8 0.4% 1 0.1%
Construction Materials 13 0.7% 11 0.3% 2 0.3%
Construction 3 0.2% 3 0.3% 0 0.0%
Steel Works Etc 21 1.1% 21 0.0% 0 0.0%
Fabricated Products 6 0.3% 6 0.0% 0 0.0%
Machinery 69 3.7% 54 5.3% 15 2.0%
Electrical Equipment 53 2.9% 8 3.5% 45 5.9%
Automobiles and Trucks 17 0.9% 14 0.4% 3 0.4%
Aircraft 11 0.6% 11 0.0% 0 0.0%
Shipbuilding, Railroad Equipment 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Defense 4 0.2% 3 0.0% 1 0.1%
Precious Metals 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Non-Metallic and Industrial Metal Mining 1 0.1% 1 0.3% 0 0.0%
Coal 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Petroleum and Natural Gas 52 2.8% 51 4.1% 1 0.1%
Utilities 5 0.3% 3 1.3% 2 0.3%
Communication 168 9.1% 102 4.5% 66 8.7%
Personal Services 56 3.0% 42 1.7% 14 1.8%
Business Services 564 30.4% 244 28.1% 320 42.1%
Computers 85 4.6% 45 9.8% 40 5.3%
Electronic Equipment 77 4.2% 45 5.9% 32 4.2%
Measuring and Control Equipment 34 1.8% 25 4.4% 9 1.2%
Business Supplies 12 0.6% 9 0.8% 3 0.4%
Shipping Containers 5 0.3% 5 0.0% 0 0.0%
Transportation 18 1.0% 10 0.6% 8 1.1%
Wholesale 67 3.6% 34 3.1% 33 4.3%
Retail 76 4.1% 40 3.5% 36 4.7%
Restaurants, Hotels, Motels 27 1.5% 19 2.5% 8 1.1%
Banking 16 0.9% 11 0.7% 5 0.7%
Insurance 25 1.3% 16 1.0% 9 1.2%
Real Estate 5 0.3% 3 0.1% 2 0.3%
Trading 24 1.3% 20 0.0% 4 0.5%
Almost Nothing 19 1.0% 16 1.4% 3 0.4%
Total 1853 100.0% 1093 100.0% 760 100.0%
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of both primary and secondary shares. Then using CRSP, the sample is trimmed based on share
codes 10 and 11 to exclude closed-end funds, unit investment trusts, real estate investment trusts,
and American Depositary Receipts). Any missing data insufficient to calculate returns are also
excluded. The criteria are in accordance with the reference paper – Golubov et.al. (2015), as well
as older SEO performance papers by Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2000).
Following the argument by Golubuv et. al. (2015) – supposed an equity-financed acquisition has
a similar value effect as cash-financed acquisitions, one should not expect any difference between
cash and equity-financed acquisition CAR after the removal of equity financing effect. If there
exists a difference where stock-financed acquisitions are lower than cash-financed acquisitions,
then it is safe to conclude the possibilities of Jensen’s overvalued equity hypothesis. This
hypothesis elaborates that overvalued equity facilitates an environment where managers of a firm
have lower managerial discipline and has the tendency to select non-value-added investment
projects.
For the SEO issuance ICARSEO (Table III), the mean (median) ICARSEO reported is -2.27% (-
2.14%), significant at a 1% significance level. This negative return is also consistent with the
findings from Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995). By taking a
quick calculation, subtracting -2.26% (ICARSEO) from -0.57% (ACARstock) yields a 1.69%. This
pure-takeover return is quite close to ACARcash, hence this back envelop calculation does not
suggest the presence of Jensen’s overvalued equity hypothesis.
It is also imperative to look into the firm characteristics of SEO issuers and equity-acquirers for a
fair comparison. This biggest difference noticed is the MARCAP – market capitalization of the
sample, where equity acquirers are on average 30x bigger than SEO firms. SEO firms also have
on average a lower book-to-market ratio (BEME), lower buy-to-hold excess returns (RUNUP),
lower idiosyncratic volatility (SIGMA) and lower debt outstanding (LEVERAGE). In terms of
liquid assets and operational ratios, SEO issuers outperform equity acquirers. Higher OPERPERF,
higher cash-holding (CASHHOLD), and cash-flow-to equity ratio (CF/EQ) are seen on average
for SEO issuers. Since there are significant differences between the issuers and acquirers, it is not
possible to directly subtract the CAR returns, but it is necessary to imply the SEO announcement
returns given a set of characteristics or conduct propensity score matching.
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Table III. SEO sample descriptive statistics
The table shows the sample descriptive statistics for 1,092 completed SEOs by US issuers from 1 January 1985 and 31 December
2009. Data are collected from the Thomson Financial SDC New Issues Database. All variables are defined in Appendix 7.1. Panel
A describes the variables, Panel B presents the yearly composition, and Panel C the industry composition of the sample. NSEO
denotes the number of observations.
NSEO Mean SD Min P25 Median P75 Max
Panel A: Variables summary statistics
MARCAP (in $ mil.) 1092 363.31 995.86 8.47 96.59 186.22 373.60 19,569.93
BEME 1092 0.358 0.277 -0.536 0.182 0.290 0.462 2.595
RUN-UP 1092 -0.022 0.097 -0.507 -0.078 -0.024 0.031 0.424
SIGMA 1092 0.038 0.015 0.013 0.029 0.036 0.045 0.155
LEVERAGE 1092 0.188 0.210 0.000 0.012 0.119 0.309 1.829
CASHHOLD 1092 0.269 0.274 0.000 0.034 0.167 0.439 0.980
OPERPERF 1092 0.046 0.452 -12.413 0.036 0.122 0.187 0.535
CF/EQ 1092 0.036 0.138 -1.660 0.000 0.044 0.089 1.489
PROCEED 1092 60.342 112.477 1.200 21.375 40.350 72.000 2782.500
RELSIZE 1092 0.241 0.146 0.008 0.148 0.213 0.298 1.179
COMBINED 1092 0.560 0.497 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
ACAR 1092 (2.27%) 9.86% (62.20%) (7.95%) (2.14%) 3.60% 37.96%
Year NSEO %





























Panel C: Distribution by Fama-French 48 industries
Agriculture 6 0.5%
Food Products 11 1.0%
Candy & Soda 0 0.0%
Beer & Liquor 1 0.1%
Tobacco Products 0 0.0%
Recreation 7 0.6%
Entertainment 19 1.7%
Printing and Publishing 2 0.2%
Consumer Goods 7 0.6%
Apparel 11 1.0%
Healthcare 43 3.9%
Medical Equipment 49 4.5%
Pharmaceutical Products 115 10.5%
Chemicals 11 1.0%
Rubber and Plastic Products 5 0.5%
Textiles 3 0.3%
Construction Materials 8 0.7%
Construction 7 0.6%
Steel Works Etc 14 1.3%
Fabricated Products 4 0.4%
Machinery 39 3.6%
Electrical Equipment 47 4.3%
Automobiles and Trucks 9 0.8%
Aircraft 3 0.3%
Shipbuilding, Railroad Equipment 0 0.0%
Defense 3 0.3%
Precious Metals 0 0.0%
Non-Metallic and Industrial Metal Mining 1 0.1%
Coal 0 0.0%
Petroleum and Natural Gas 16 1.5%
Utilities 20 1.8%
Communication 25 2.3%
Personal Services 20 1.8%
Business Services 178 16.3%
Computers 52 4.8%
Electronic Equipment 84 7.7%
Measuring and Control Equipment 27 2.5%
Business Supplies 1 0.1%




Restaurants, Hotels, Motels 39 3.6%
Banking 12 1.1%
Insurance 9 0.8%
Real Estate 1 0.1%
Trading 17 1.6%




4.1 Implied equity financing
There are two methods of estimation based on the firm characteristics of SEO firms. The first uses
a linear prediction method where the HCAR implied is a result of directly using the coefficient
estimates of a cross-sectional regression of SEO samples on the stock-financed acquirer variables.
The second method removes the confounding effect and increases the similarity between stock-
acquirers (treatment) and SEO issuers (control) using one-dimensional propensity score (1-nearest
and 10-nearest matching) and subclass weights as propensity score (full-optimal matching) to
estimate the treatment effects.
The difference in methods is mainly that for the linear prediction method, HCAR is synthetically
produced, extrapolating coefficient estimates from SEO sample and obtaining fitted values with
stock-financed takeover sample, whereas the propensity score matching method is critical upon
the sample of SEO and only selects (match) those SEO samples that are similar in characteristics
to treatment sample, then taking the real ACARstock to obtain PCARstock. Since there is no way to
justify a more superior model, this paper will only draw conclusions when the results show a
majority or two-out-of-four negative PCARall and STOCK coefficients.
The variables selected for SEO and M&A acquirers are such that they are applicable to both SEO
issuers and M&A acquirers and they are found to have a significant impact on returns of both
events in prior research. All of these explanatory variables are both in the linear prediction model
–the cross-sectional model of SEO announcement returns, as well as determinants of the
propensity score (probit model) in the propensity-score matching method. As with the reference
paper (Golubov et.al., 2015), this paper similarly included variables (not restricted to post-IPO
SEO and stock-financed mergers): “firm size (LN (MARCAP)) (Lee and Masulis (2009) for SEOs;
Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) for mergers), book-to-market ratio (BEME) (Bayless
and Chaplinsky (1996) for SEOs; Servaes (1991) and Dong et al. (2006) for mergers), stock price
run-up (RUN-UP) (Bayless and Chaplinksy (1996) for SEOs; Rosen (2006) for mergers), stock
return idiosyncratic volatility (SIGMA) (Dierkens (1991) for SEOs and Moeller, Schlingemann,
and Stulz (2007) for mergers), the relative size of the deal (issue or acquisition) (RELSIZE)
(Asquith and Mullins (1986) for SEOs; Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002) for mergers), cash
holdings (CASH HOLD) (Kim and Purnanandam (2014) for SEOs; Harford (1999) for mergers),
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leverage ratio (LEVERAGE) (Lee and Masulis (2009) for SEOs; Maloney, McCormick and
Mitchell (1993) for mergers), operating performance measured by the return on assets (OPER
PERFORM) (Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) for SEOs; Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) for
mergers) and cash-flow-to-equity (CF/EQ) (Jung, Kim, and Stulz (1996) for SEOs; Lang, Stulz,
and Walkling (1991) for mergers).” Calendar year and Fama-French 48 industries classification
fixed effects are also included.
Table IV- Panel A shows a fixed-effect regression for the cross-sectional regression model of SEO
returns (Specification (1)) and the probit model of equity issuance choice (Specification (2)). The
first specification shows that RUNUP and CF/EQ have a significant and positive effect on
announcement returns. Although both are inconsistent with the general SEO literature since a
negative effect is expected for both coefficients (McLaughlin, Safieddine Vasudevan, 1996; Lucas
and Macdonald, 1990), the RUNUP inconsistency works to the favor of this paper because of its
relevance towards post-IPO SEO (Jiang, Stohs, and Xie, 2008). For the second specification, the
positive and significant coefficients are LN(MARCAP), BEME, RUNUP, LEVERAGE,
CASHHOLD, and CF/EQ. Only OPERPERF is negative. Therefore, firms choosing to engage in
the stock-financed acquisition are relatively larger, have higher book value/market value ratios,
have larger pre-announcement stock price runups, higher leverage, higher cash holdings, higher
cash-flow-to-equity ratio, but lower operating performance. Again, since the objective is to
minimize the difference between these 2 events, the paper hopes to diminish the significant
difference using propensity score matching.
Table IV – Panel B continues to show the matching diagnostics for the propensity-score matching
method together with the explanatory variables. The various propensity score model is stock-
financed acquisitions, unmatched SEOs, full optimal matching, 1-nearest, and 10-nearest
neighbors. It is important to compare the difference in various models and the effectiveness of
reducing the difference between these variables. The desired outcome is for the p-value to be large
statistically insignificant, which indicates that the treatment and control sample characteristics are
similar.
Starting with the unmatched SEO, most variables show a p-value at 0.000, except for RUNUP
(0.003), LEVERAGE (0.003), and CF/EQ (0.037), meaning most variables are very different for
treatment (equity-financed acquirers) and control (SEO issuers). Across all the models, the
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evidence shows a great reduction in magnitude differences for most variables – LNMARCAP,
BEME, RUNUP, SIGMA, RELSIZE, CASHHOLD and PROPENSITY SCORE. The full-optimal
matching seems to provide the best improvement, large and positive change, which allows for the
greatest minimizing of absolute standardized mean difference (refer Appendix 7.2). For example,
the RUNUP variable achieved a reduction of 90.9% for full-optimal matching compared to 1-
nearest (63.2%) or 10-nearest (2.1%). Similarly, SIGMA achieved a reduction of 63.7% in full-
matching, 11.9% in 1-nearest, and a worsen -10.4% in 10-nearest matching. This is not surprising
because full-optimal matching forces an “optimal” matching that provides the minimum absolute
standardized mean difference, by catering to different control-treatment pairing across the sample.
In other words, some treatments might be paired with one-nearest and some others might be paired
with 2-nearest to achieve the greatest result. One-nearest matching also manages to reduce the
difference to an extent (range: 11.9% to 63.2%), however, the p-value does not show a significant
difference between treatment and control. 10-nearest matching performed the worst with most of
the variables increase in absolute standardized mean difference (negative % change) and the p-
value significance is rather unchanged from unmatched SEO.
The average propensity score of full-optimal matching is almost the same as stock-financed M&A,
with the p-value almost reaching 1, meaning the treatment and control are almost identical. One-
nearest and 10-nearest however do not show convincing p-value to argue for a successful match.
Overall, these diagnostics demonstrate that the full-optimal matching is the best propensity-score
matching technique, followed by 1-nearest.
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Table IV. Cross-sectional OLS regression of ICARs, probit regression of equity issuance choice, and variable
matching diagnostic
The first column in Panel A shows the estimation results of a cross-sectional OLS regression of issuer CAR (ICAR) on
issuer and offer characteristics common to both seasoned equity issuers and stock acquirers (Specification (1)). The
second column in Panel A shows the probit regression results of choosing between issuing stock via a stock-
financed acquisition and an SEO using the same explanatory variables (Specification (2)). All variables are defined
in Appendix 7.1. Symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0%, 1%, and 5% level, respectively.
NSEO denotes the number of observations for SEO ICAR. NSEO+M&A, stock denotes the number of observations for SEO
ICAR and stock-financed M&A ACAR.
Panel B presents matching diagnostics for the propensity-score matching methodology. % |Diff| is the absolute
difference in means for stock acquirers and SEO firms, as percentage of the former. % Δ |Diff| is the achieved
percentage reduction in the absolute difference in means for stock-acquirers and SEO firms resulting from
matching (negative values indicate increases in differences). The p-values for the differences in means for the two
samples are also presented.
Panel A: Estimation results ICAR (1) STOCK DEAL/SEO (2)
Intercept 0.001 -30.034
(0.913) (0.975)
LMNARCAP 0.000 0.786 ***
(0.923) (0.000)
BEME -0.001 0.553 **
(0.551) (0.009)






LEVERAGE 0.000 2.730 ***
(0.970) (0.000)
CASHHOLD 0.002 2.037 ***
(0.562) (0.000)
CF/EQ 0.011 * 3.276 ***
(0.015) (0.000)
OPERPERF 0.000 -0.796 *
(0.864) (0.019)
Year FE Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes
NSEO; NSEO+M&A, stock 1092 1855
R2 (Adjusted R2) [Pseudo R2] 0.974 (0.972) [0.393]
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4.2 “Pure” takeover returns
With the use of implied equity financing returns (HCAR), the pure-takeover returns (PCARstock)
of stock-financed acquisitions can be found. This PCARstock is derived by removing (subtracting)
HCAR from ACARstock, essentially separating the announcement effect of equity financing. For
cash-financed acquisitions, this is not necessary because it is assumed that ACARcash is equivalent
to PCARcash.
From Table V, the average PCARstock are -0.02%, -0.32%, 0.39%, and -0.18% for linear prediction,
full-matching, 1-nearest, and 10-nearest neighbor respectively. None of this is statistically
significant, hence there lacks evidence that stock-financed acquisitions are consistently value-
destructive investments. Looking at statistically significant results for cash acquisitions, it can be
Stock-financed Unmatched
Panel B: Matching diagnostics M&As SEOs Full Optimal 1 Nearest 10 Nearest
LMNARCAP Mean 13.575 12.144 13.441 12.552 12.121
%|Diff| 10.5% 1.0% 7.5% 10.7%
%Δ|Diff| . 90.6% 28.5% -1.7%
p-Value 0.000 0.095 0.000 0.000
BEME Mean 0.289 0.358 0.358 0.343 0.365
%|Diff| -23.8% -23.8% -18.7% -26.4%
%Δ|Diff| . 91.4% 13.2% -7.0%
p-Value 0.000 0.523 0.000 0.000
RUN-UP Mean -0.006 -0.022 -0.004 -0.012 -0.022
%|Diff| -293.9% 27.7% -108.2% -288.2%
%Δ|Diff| . 90.9% 63.2% 2.1%
p-Value 0.003 0.785 0.302 0.004
SIGMA Mean 0.044 0.038 0.046 0.039 0.038
%|Diff| 12.8% -4.6% 11.2% 14.1%
%Δ|Diff| . 63.7% 11.9% -10.4%
p-Value 0.000 0.030 0.000 0.000
RELSIZE Mean 0.166 0.241 0.169 0.207 0.239
%|Diff| -45.6% -1.8% -25.1% -44.4%
%Δ|Diff| . 96.1% 45.0% 2.5%
p-Value 0.000 0.750 0.000 0.000
LEVERAGE Mean 0.215 0.188 0.272 0.194 0.186
%|Diff| 12.5% -26.3% 10.1% 13.4%
%Δ|Diff| . -110.2% 19.3% -7.3%
p-Value 0.003 0.000 0.035 0.001
CASHHOLD Mean 0.388 0.269 0.391 0.317 0.267
%|Diff| 30.7% -0.9% 18.3% 31.1%
%Δ|Diff| . 97.1% 40.3% -1.3%
p-Value 0.000 0.797 0.000 0.000
CF/EQ Mean 0.058 0.036 0.016 0.039 0.038
%|Diff| 38.4% 72.7% 32.8% 34.3%
%Δ|Diff| . -89.1% 14.6% 10.6%
p-Value 0.037 0.000 0.078 0.060
OPERPERF Mean -0.038 0.046 -0.274 0.020 0.051
%|Diff| 220.6% -621.2% 153.4% 233.6%
%Δ|Diff| . -181.7% 30.4% -5.9%
p-Value 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.000
PROPENSITY Mean 0.590 0.287 0.590 0.366 0.273
SCORE %|Diff| 51.4% 0.0% 37.9% 53.8%
%Δ|Diff| . 100.0% 26.2% -4.6%
p-Value 0.000 0.992 0.000 0.000
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concluded that cash acquisitions create a relatively high value (1.54%) for the firm. Naturally, the
paper is also interested in the disparity between pure-takeover returns of cash and stock deals.
There is a significant difference (p-value < 0.000) between cash and stock deal for most of the
model except for the linear prediction model. The differences of 2.11%, 1.86%, 1.93%, and 1.72%
for conventional, full-optimal, one-nearest, and 10-nearest neighbors are all significantly different
from zero, hence the paper finds a systematic difference between cash and stock deal, providing
the first support for Jensen’s hypothesis (2005).
Table V. Comparisons of ACARs, HCARs, and PCARs
The table shows the univariate comparisons of mean ACARs, HCARs, and PCARs. All variables are defined in
Appendix 7.1. The different columns present five types of cumulative abnormal returns (CAR from the market
model). The ACAR and PCAR for cash acquisitions reported are unchanged. For conventional ACAR, stock acquirer’s
CARs are not adjusted for financing effect. For linear PCAR, the HCAR financing effects are hypothetical CARs
generated from a regression between SEO ICAR and firm characteristics (Equation 3). For the one-nearest and 10-
nearest models, the HCAR financing effects are based on the one or ten-matched SEO ICAR. For full-optimal CAR,
the HCAR financing effect is based on the n-matched SEO ICAR, individually customized n to minimize the absolute
standardized mean difference (Appendix 7.2). Numbers in parentheses are p-values (significance tests are two-
tailed). N denotes the number of observations for all deals, cash deals and stock deals.
A multi-variate regression is also important because this difference could be explained by acquirer
or deal characteristics like firm size and deal attitude, apart from the different methods of payment.
In that case, the paper could incorrectly conclude the presence of Jensen’s overvalued equity
agency cost due to method of stock payment. In Table VI, the PCARall is regressed against the
method of payment variable (STOCK) and other acquirer and deal-specific characteristics. The
variables taken into account are similar to the acquirer/issuer variables in Table IV, with an
addition of deal characteristics – TENDER (Jensen and Ruback, 1983), HOSTILE (Servaes, 1991),
Conventional Linear Full Optimal 1 nearest 10 nearest
ACAR HCAR PCAR HCAR PCAR HCAR PCAR HCAR PCAR
All (1)
Mean 0.67% -0.55% 1.22% -0.24% 0.92% -0.18% 0.85% -0.39% 1.06%
0.538 0.280 0.000 0.657 0.000 0.265 0.000 0.304 0.000
NM&A, all 1853 1853 1853 1853 1853 1853 1853 1853 1853
Cash (2)
Mean 1.54% . 1.54% . 1.54% . 1.54% . 1.54%
0.000 . 0.000 . 0.000 . 0.000 . 0.000
NM&A, cash 1093 . 1093 . 1093 . 1093 . 1093
Stock (3)
Mean -0.57% -0.55% -0.02% -0.24% -0.32% -0.18% -0.39% -0.39% -0.18%
0.241 0.280 0.811 0.657 0.133 0.265 0.988 0.304 0.718
NM&A, stock 760 760 760 760 760 760 760 760 760
Difference (2) - (3)
Mean 2.11% . 1.56% . 1.86% . 1.93% . 1.72%
0.000 . 0.291 . 0.000 . 0.000 . 0.000
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and MULTIBID (James and Wier, 1987). All these are further defined in Appendix 7.1. The
regression is also estimated with year and industry fixed effects.
Table VI. Cross-sectional regressions of PCARs and ACARs
The table presents the results of cross-sectional regression analysis of PCARs and ACARs. PCARs are pure takeover
abnormal returns, adjusted for financing effects (Equation 4). ACARs are raw announcement effects post-M&A. All
variables are defined in Appendix 7.1. The p-values are reported with symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical
significance at the 0%, 1%, and 5% level, respectively. N denotes the number of observations for cash and stock-
financed M&A. Year and industry fixed effects (coefficients suppressed) are based on calendar year and Fama-
French 48 industry classification dummies.
The different columns present five types of cumulative abnormal returns (CAR from the market model). The CARs
for cash acquisitions reported are the same across all columns. For conventional ACAR, stock acquirer’s CARs are
not adjusted for financing effect. For linear PCAR, the financing effects are hypothetical CARs generated from a
regression between SEO ICAR and firm characteristics (Equation 3). For the one-nearest and 10-nearest models,
the financing effects are based on the one or ten-matched SEO ICAR. For full-optimal CAR, the financing effect is
based on the n-matched SEO ICAR, individually customized n to minimize the absolute standardized mean
difference (Appendix 7.2).
Across the four models, there is a mix of negative and positive STOCK coefficients, similar to the
results by reference paper – Golubov et al. (2015), however inconsistent with Jensen’s hypothesis
that post-IPO stock-financed acquisitions destroy more value than post-IPO cash-financed
acquisitions. The latter analysis shows only a significance at a 5% level of significance for the full-
optimal model, however, indicates that the method of payment does not significantly explain the
Coventional Linear Full Optimal 1 nearest 10 nearest
ACAR PCAR PCAR PCAR PCAR
STOCK 0.001 -0.007 -0.009 * 0.006 0.008 ***
(0.563) (0.074) (0.012) (0.127) (0.000)
LMNARCAP 0.000 0.002 0.001 -0.005 *** -0.002 ***
(0.194) (0.139) (0.333) (0.000) (0.000)
BEME 0.004 ** 0.003 0.000 0.009 0.003
(0.001) (0.573 ) (0.933) (0.082) (0.086)
RUN-UP 1.004 *** 0.449 *** 0.451 *** 0.994 *** 0.999 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SIGMA 0.025 0.486 *** 0.433 *** -0.020 -0.002
(0.533) (0.000) (0.000) (0.889) (0.968)
RELSIZE 0.002 0.009 * 0.008 * -0.003 0.002
(0.137) (0.016) (0.027) (0.497) (0.301)
TENDER -0.001 0.004 0.005 -0.003 0.000
(0.635) (0.533) (0.426) (0.729) (0.953)
HOSTILE -0.002 0.023 0.021 0.007 0.004
(0.911) (0.713) (0.719) (0.912) (0.866)
MULTIBID 0.008 -0.015 -0.021 0.023 0.006
(0.184) (0.461) (0.294) (0.297) (0.469)
LEVERAGE 0.001 -0.011 -0.011 0.005 -0.004
(0.843) (0.378) (0.384) (0.702) (0.463)
CASH HOLD 0.001 -0.007 -0.006 -0.001 -0.007 *
(0.790) (0.342) (0.387) (0.913) (0.019)
CF/EQ -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.005 -0.003
(0.616) (0.441) (0.636) (0.242) (0.050)
OPERPERF -0.001 0.020 * 0.021 ** 0.008 0.007
(0.735) (0.061) (0.043) (0.478) (0.104)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
NM&A, all 1853 1853 1853 1853 1853
R2 (Adjusted R2) 0.978 (0.977) 0.475 (0.451) 0.492 (0.469) 0.768 (0.758) 0.956 (0.954)
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PCARall, apart from other firms and deal characteristics. The variable RUNUP appears to be
consistently large, positive and statistically significant at <0.001% level as an explanatory variable
for PCARall. This is inconsistent with the research by Celikyurt et. al. (2010) and Purnanandam
and Swaminathan (2004), however, this finding points towards the counterargument of Jensen’s
hypothesis, in which, the merger momentum is shown rewarding enthusiastic managers who are
driven to find positive investments instead.
In order to test for the recency of IPO firms, the paper also repeated the analysis for a post-one
year and three years M&As (Appendix 7.3 – Table VII, VIII, IX, X). The PCARstock for three years
are respectively -0.09%, -0.65%, -0.69% and -0.70%. The PCARstock for one-year are respectively
0.1%, -0.28%, -0.91% and -0.19%. There seems to be no apparent trend for the PCAR across the
years either. Only the three years univariate comparison for PCARstock shows a consistent negative
PCAR pattern across all models. For the multivariate regression, few indicate a significant result
and most have small magnitudes.
In conclusion, similar to Golubov et al. (2015), this paper provides limited evidence to conclude
that the method of payment explains the cross-section of recent-IPO acquirer’s returns, assuming
that this sample is more susceptible to Jensen’s overvalued equity agency cost. Even with the
removal of implied equity price effects and other determinants of acquirer returns, there is little
significant evidence pointing to stock-financed acquisitions being a negative NPV investment
decision.
Alternative corporate governance theory further suggests that post-IPO stock-financed
acquisitions are subjected to stringent public market rules and pressures, hence leaving little room
for value-destructive motives to take place (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Grossman and Hart, 1988;
Zingales, 1995). The effect is especially positive for post-IPO firms with relatively higher
institutional holdings, which creates another checkpoint for any potential misuse of equity
investments (Anderson and Huang, 2016). For now, this might sufficiently reconcile the disparity
between overvalued equity motivation and the lack of evidence for value-destructive investments.
5. Conclusion
Is the motivation to engage in a post-IPO stock-financed acquisition a value-destructive decision,
especially given the abundance of cash and favorable financing position? Apart from the desire to
answer this question, this paper primarily aims to identify and to deter against any potential value-
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destructive decisions, such as described by Jensen (2005) – first being enticed by the abundance
and availability of cheap and overvalued equity, then engaging in “excessive internal spending”
and “risky negative net present value investments”, and eventually turning to various fraudulent
practices such as “accounting manipulation to continue the appearance of growth and value
creation”. This paper referenced closely the research by Golubov, Petmezas, and Travlos (2015),
with the expectation of finding greater presence of Jensen’s overvalued equity hypothesis, induced
by overconfidence and post-IPO enthusiasm (Brau, Couch and Sutton, 2012).
This paper uses a targeted sample of recent post-IPO M&A rather than a broad M&A sample. The
paper also employs the methodology by Golubov, Petmezas, and Travlos (2015) – a linear
prediction and various propensity matching methods to isolate the equity financing effect from the
stock-financed announcement effect. These methods critically assess the true value effect found in
takeover announcements.
Following univariate and multivariate analysis, similar to the results by Golubov et al. (2015),
there is no evidence to conclude for the presence of overvalued equity agency costs. This means
that under tempting conditions of using cheap equity to justify high valuations, overconfident post-
IPO managers are not shown to pursue negative net present value investments. Even with the
analysis of post-one-year and three-year data, there is no evidence to conclude otherwise. It is
possible that a stringent public market regulation landscape and institutional holdings discourage
any potential motivation to engage in value-destructive investments.
5.1 Limitations and potential future research
Several limitations in this paper could affect the results presented in this paper. In no particular
rank of priority, the main limitations are (i) the insufficient SEO sample to perform a 10 nearest-
neighbor matching, (ii) the potential difference between characteristics of mature SEO sample and
recent-SEO sample affecting HCAR, and (iii) the potential influence of third joint effect from a
lingering recent IPO announcement effect.
The 10-nearest neighbor matching (without replacement) require a sample greater than 1,092 SEO.
When the matching conducted is “with replacement”, the control group selected is recycled and
matched more than once, which potentially overweight a given HCAR, affecting the PCARstock
results in this paper.
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In this paper, the SEO sample is indifferent of whether the firm performs an SEO within the year
of IPO or the next n-years post-IPO. The differences in underpricing, size, volatility and run-up
prices can affect the probit model in Table IV, as well as the subsequent estimation for HCAR and
PCARstock (Intintoli, Jagadeesh, and Kahle, 2013; Jegadeesh, Weinstein, and Welch, 1993).
Therefore, future research can use different SEO samples based on n-years post-IPO to perform
matching with the treatment group.
By considering a third effect – HCARIPO, future research can also draw more critical conclusions
regarding Jensen’s agency effect. Since many IPO-related research show evidences of lingering
long-term performance post-IPO (Ibbotson, 1975; Aggarwal & Rivoli, 1990), future research
should consider the presence and if necessary, the removal of any lingering IPO announcement
effect.
Given the argument for opportunistic overvaluation tendencies by recent-IPO firms, future
research could include related variables, such as VC-backed, high-tech dummy variable and other
underpricing metrics, directly analyzing the relationship of overconfidence and PCAR. Lastly, to
reconcile the lack of evidence in this paper, future research can examine the level of institutional
holdings and degree of stringent regulations, following the research by Jensen and Meckling
(1976), Grossman and Hart (1988) and Anderson and Huang (2016). The expected hypothesis for
these tests would be higher institutional holdings and stricter regulations resulting in higher value-
driven post-IPO stock acquisitions.
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Most variables descriptions follow closely the definitions by Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos (2015).
Variable Definition
Panel A: Dependent variables and the method of payment
ICAR Cumulative abnormal return of the IPO issuer in the 5-day event window
(-2, +2) centered on the announcement (filing) day reported by Thomson
Financial SDC. The expected returns are from a market model with the
parameters estimated over 200 trading days ending 41 days prior to the
announcement. The market return is proxied by CRSP value-weighted
index return.
HCAR Hypothetical stock price reaction in an event of an IPO by the stock
acquirer calculated as a linear prediction (obtained by multiplying the
stock acquirer characteristics by the coefficient estimates from a regression
of ICAR on the corresponding issuer characteristics) or as returns of
propensity-score matched IPO issuers.
ACAR Cumulative abnormal return of the acquiring firm in the 5-day event
window (-2, +2) centered on the announcement day reported by Thomson
Financial SDC. The expected returns are from a market model with the
parameters estimated over 200 trading days ending 41 days prior to the
announcement. The market return is proxied by CRSP value-weighted
index return.
PCAR ACAR - HCAR when the acquisition is stock-financed (STOCK = 1),
ACAR when the acquisitions is cash-financed (STOCK = 0).
STOCK Indicator variable: 1 for deals where consideration is 100% stock, 0 for
deals where consideration is 100% cash, as reported by Thomson Financial
SDC.
Panel B: Acquirer/issuer characteristics
MARCAP Market capitalization 4 weeks prior to the acquisition/issue announcement
from CRSP (in $ mil. inflation adjusted to 2009 using the US GDP
deflator).
BEME Book value of equity divided by market value of equity (shares
outstanding times the closing price) at the fiscal year-end immediately
prior to the announcement, all numbers are from Compustat.
RUN-UP Buy-and-hold excess (market-adjusted) return of the firm’s common stock
over the period starting 205 days and ending 6 days prior to the
announcement date from CRSP.
SIGMA Idiosyncratic volatility of the firm’s common stock measured as the
standard deviation of daily excess (market-adjusted) returns from WRDS
Beta Suite over the period starting 205 and ending 6 days before the
announcement.
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LEVERAGE Total financial debt (long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities) divided
by the book value of total assets for the fiscal year prior to acquisition
announcement from Compustat.
CF/EQ Income before extraordinary items plus depreciation minus dividends on
common and preferred stock divided by the number of shares outstanding
times the closing stock price at the fiscal year-end immediately prior to the
announcement from Compustat.
CASH HOLD Cash and cash equivalents divided by the book value of total assets for the
fiscal year-end immediately prior to the announcement from Compustat.
OPER PERFORM Operating income before depreciation divided by the book value of total
assets for the fiscal year-end immediately prior to the announcement from
Compustat.
Panel C: Deal/issue characteristics
DEAL VALUE Value of the deal/issue as reported by Thomson Financial SDC (in $ mil.
inflation-adjusted to 2009 using the US GDP deflator).
RELSIZE Value of the deal/issue from Thomson Financial SDC divided by the
acquirer/issuer market value of equity 4 weeks prior to the announcement
from CRSP.
HOSTILE Indicator variable: 1 for deals labeled as “hostile” or “unsolicited” by
Thomson Financial SDC, 0 otherwise
TENDER Indicator variable: 1 for tender offers identified as such by Thomson
Financial SDC, 0 otherwise.
MULTIBID Indicator variable: 1 for deals involving competing bidders as reported by
Thomson Financial SDC, 0 otherwise.
COMBINED Indicator variable: 1 for equity offers which include secondary shares as
reported by Thomson Financial SDC, 0 otherwise.
7.2 Propensity score matching
Figure I. Absolute Standardized Mean Difference for full-optimal, 1-nearest, and 10-nearest neighbor matching.
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7.3 Other specifications and tests
Table VII. Comparisons of ACARs, HCARs, and PCARs for 317 M&As conducted within one-year of IPO.
The table shows the univariate comparisons of mean ACARs, HCARs, and PCARs. All variables are defined in
Appendix 7.1. The different columns present five types of cumulative abnormal returns (CAR from the market
model). The ACAR and PCAR for cash acquisitions reported are unchanged. For conventional ACAR, stock acquirer’s
CARs are not adjusted for financing effect. For linear PCAR, the HCAR financing effects are hypothetical CARs
generated from a regression between SEO ICAR and firm characteristics (Equation 3). For the one-nearest and 10-
nearest models, the HCAR financing effects are based on the one or ten-matched SEO ICAR. For full-optimal CAR,
the HCAR financing effect is based on the n-matched SEO ICAR, individually customized n to minimize the absolute
standardized mean difference (Appendix 7.2). Numbers in parentheses are p-values (significance tests are two-
tailed). N denotes the number of observations for all deals, cash deals and stock deals.
Conventional Linear Full Optimal 1 nearest 10 nearest
ACAR HCAR PCAR HCAR PCAR HCAR PCAR HCAR PCAR
All (1)
Mean 1.68% 0.07% 1.61% 0.44% 1.24% 1.07% 0.61% 0.35% 1.33%
0.014 0.958 0.000 0.730 0.001 0.954 0.000 0.839 0.000
NM&A, all 317 317 317 317 317 317 317 317 317
Cash (2)
Mean 2.76% . 2.76% . 2.76% . 2.76% . 2.76%
0.000 . 0.000 . 0.000 . 0.000 . 0.000
NM&A, cash 185 . 185 . 185 . 185 . 185
Stock (3)
Mean 0.16% 0.07% 0.10% 0.44% -0.28% 1.07% -0.91% 0.35% -0.19%
0.899 0.958 0.660 0.730 0.710 0.954 0.676 0.839 0.620
NM&A, stock 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132
Difference (2) - (3)
Mean 2.60% . 2.67% . 3.04% . 3.67% . 2.95%
0.077 . 0.959 . 0.728 . 0.955 . 0.837
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Table VIII. Cross-sectional regressions of PCARs and ACARs for 317 M&As conducted within one-year of IPO.
The table presents the results of cross-sectional regression analysis of PCARs and ACARs. PCARs are pure takeover
abnormal returns, adjusted for financing effects (Equation 4). ACARs are raw announcement effects post-M&A. All
variables are defined in Appendix 7.1. The p-values are reported with symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical
significance at the 0%, 1%, and 5% level, respectively. N denotes the number of observations for cash and stock-
financed M&A. Year and industry fixed effects (coefficients suppressed) are based on calendar year and Fama-
French 48 industry classification dummies.
Coventional Linear Full Optimal 1 nearest 10 nearest
ACAR PCAR PCAR PCAR PCAR
STOCK -0.003 -0.028 * -0.027 ** -0.007 -0.005
(0.452) (0.012) (0.005) (0.524) (0.195)
LMNARCAP 0.001 0.004 0.003 -0.004 0.001
(0.576) (0.252) (0.369) (0.212) (0.616)
BEME 0.000 -0.012 -0.005 0.004 0.004
(0.946) (0.606) (0.805) (0.846) (0.577)
RUN-UP 0.999 *** 0.378 *** 0.389 *** 1.008 *** 0.978 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SIGMA -0.186 0.623 0.704 * -0.707 -0.155
(0.106) (0.102) (0.039) (0.056) (0.245)
RELSIZE 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.005 0.001
(0.590) (0.867) (0.895) (0.607) (0.675)
TENDER -0.002 0.002 0.032 0.004 0.002
(0.808) (0.929) (0.121) (0.842) (0.853)
HOSTILE -0.001 0.025 -0.007 0.018 0.001
(0.965) (0.723) (0.908) (0.802) (0.962)
MULTIBID 0.004 -0.054 -0.088 0.045 -0.006
(0.854) (0.474) (0.175) (0.525) (0.818)
LEVERAGE 0.029 * 0.058 0.031 0.118 ** 0.034 *
(0.021) (0.157) (0.386) (0.002) (0.015)
CASH HOLD 0.006 -0.008 -0.011 -0.021 0.004
(0.300) (0.673) (0.514) (0.247) (0.491)
CF/EQ 0.005 0.010 0.004 0.002 0.004
(0.106) (0.364) (0.670) (0.856) (0.233)
OPERPERF -0.001 -0.022 -0.028 -0.070 * -0.006
(0.939) (0.462) (0.294) (0.014) (0.550)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
NM&A, all 317 317 317 317 317
R2 (Adjusted R2) 0.981 (0.976) 0.516 (0.384) 0.483 (0.420) 0.809 (0.786) 0.967 (0.963)
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Table IX. Comparisons of ACARs, HCARs, and PCARs for 1,242 M&As conducted within three-year of IPO.
The table shows the univariate comparisons of mean ACARs, HCARs, and PCARs. All variables are defined in
Appendix 7.1. The different columns present five types of cumulative abnormal returns (CAR from the market
model). The ACAR and PCAR for cash acquisitions reported are unchanged. For conventional ACAR, stock acquirer’s
CARs are not adjusted for financing effect. For linear PCAR, the HCAR financing effects are hypothetical CARs
generated from a regression between SEO ICAR and firm characteristics (Equation 3). For the one-nearest and 10-
nearest models, the HCAR financing effects are based on the one or ten-matched SEO ICAR. For full-optimal CAR,
the HCAR financing effect is based on the n-matched SEO ICAR, individually customized n to minimize the absolute
standardized mean difference (Appendix 7.2). Numbers in parentheses are p-values (significance tests are two-
tailed). N denotes the number of observations for all deals, cash deals and stock deals.
Conventional Linear Full Optimal 1 nearest 10 nearest
ACAR HCAR PCAR HCAR PCAR HCAR PCAR HCAR PCAR
All (1)
Mean 0.50% -0.69% 1.19% -0.13% 0.63% -0.09% 0.59% -0.08% 0.58%
0.143 0.239 0.000 0.246 0.000 0.274 0.000 0.281 0.000
NM&A, all 1242 1242 1242 1242 1242 1242 1242 1242 1242
Cash (2)
Mean 1.51% . 1.51% . 1.51% . 1.51% . 1.51%
0.000 . 0.000 . 0.000 . 0.000 . 0.000
NM&A, cash 693 . 693 . 693 . 693 . 693
Stock (3)
Mean -0.78% -0.69% -0.09% -0.13% -0.65% -0.09% -0.69% -0.08% -0.70%
0.189 0.239 0.406 0.246 0.121 0.274 0.100 0.281 0.096
NM&A, stock 549 549 549 549 549 549 549 549 549
Difference (2) - (3)
Mean 2.30% . 1.60% . 2.17% . 2.21% . 2.22%
0.001 . 0.252 . 0.000 . 0.000 . 0.000
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Table X. Cross-sectional regressions of PCARs and ACARs for 1,242 M&As conducted within three-year of IPO.
The table presents the results of cross-sectional regression analysis of PCARs and ACARs. PCARs are pure takeover
abnormal returns, adjusted for financing effects (Equation 4). ACARs are raw announcement effects post-M&A. All
variables are defined in Appendix 7.1. The p-values are reported with symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical
significance at the 0%, 1%, and 5% level, respectively. N denotes the number of observations for cash and stock-
financed M&A. Year and industry fixed effects (coefficients suppressed) are based on calendar year and Fama-
French 48 industry classification dummies.
Coventional Linear Full Optimal 1 nearest 10 nearest
ACAR PCAR PCAR PCAR PCAR
STOCK 0.000 -0.008 -0.007 0.012 * 0.022 ***
(0.798) (0.096) (0.121) (0.032) (0.000)
LMNARCAP 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.007 *** 0.002 ***
(0.752) (0.121) (0.070) (0.000) (0.000)
BEME -0.005 0.008 0.031 *** 0.026 * -0.005
(0.133) (0.472) (0.001) (0.032) (0.217)
RUN-UP 1.008 *** 0.377 *** 0.395 *** 1.003 *** 1.022 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SIGMA 0.077 0.525 ** 0.446 ** 0.044 0.103 **
(0.145) (0.001) (0.003) (0.821) (0.109)
RELSIZE 0.002 0.006 0.005 -0.001 0.001
(0.118) (0.154) (0.264) (0.857) (0.653)
TENDER -0.002 0.007 0.015 -0.019 -0.003
(0.599) (0.430) (0.078) (0.090) (0.373)
HOSTILE -0.001 0.020 0.016 -0.003 -0.002
(0.977) (0.744) (0.791) (0.973) (0.943)
MULTIBID 0.011 -0.022 -0.043 * 0.005 0.002
(0.159) (0.350) (0.049) (0.849) (0.861)
LEVERAGE 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.024 0.002
(0.975) (0.988) (0.856) (0.203) (0.751)
CASH HOLD -0.002 -0.018 -0.014 0.008 -0.005
(0.478) (0.056) (0.089) (0.438) (0.163)
CF/EQ 0.001 -0.003 -0.005 0.001 0.003
(0.472) (0.519) (0.305) (0.807) (0.097)
OPERPERF 0.001 0.008 -0.003 -0.021 -0.017 **
(0.758) (0.573) (0.841) (0.201) (0.002)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
NM&A, all 1242 1242 1242 1242 1242
R2 (Adjusted R2) 0.975 (0.973) 0.428 ( 0.389) 0.419 (0.400) 0.713 (0.704) 0.959 (0.957)
